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Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists  
The Future of Banking – solving the 
current crisis while addressing long-
term challenges 
Thorsten Beck 
25 October 2011 
For better or worse, banking is back in the headlines. From the 
desperate efforts of crisis-struck Eurozone governments to the Occupy 
Wall Street movement currently spreading across the globe, the future 
of banking is hotly debated. This VoxEU.org eBook presents a collection 
of essays by leading European and American economists that discuss 
both immediate solutions to the on-going financial crisis and medium- 
to long-term regulatory reforms. 
 
Three years after the Lehman Brothers failure sent shockwaves through 
financial markets, banks are yet again in the centre of the storm. While 
in 2008 financial institutions ‘caused’ the crisis and triggered 
widespread bailouts followed by fiscal stimulus programmes to limit the 
fall-out of the banking crisis for the rest of the economy, banks now 
seem to be more on the receiving end. The sovereign debt crisis in 
several southern European countries and potential large losses from a 
write-down of Greek debt make the solvency position of many European 
banks doubtful, which in turn explains the limited funding possibilities 
for many banks. As pointed by out many economists, including Charles 
Wyplosz in this collection of essays, policy mistakes have made a bad 
situation even worse. 
The outrage about “yet another bank bail-out” is justified. The fact that 
banks are yet again in trouble shows that the previous crisis of 2008 
has not been sufficiently used for fixing the underlying problems. If 
politicians join into the outcry, however, it is hypocritical, because it 
was them, after all, who did not use the last crisis sufficiently for the 
necessary reforms. After a short period in crisis-mode, there was too 
much momentum to go back to the old regime, with some minor 
changes here and there. This is not too say that I am advocating 
“radical” solutions such as nationalization. This is not exactly radical, as 
 
Page 1 of 7The Future of Banking – solving the current crisis while addressing long-term challen...
4-11-2011http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7130
it has been tried extensively across the world and has failed. But 
wouldn’t it be actually radical to force financial institutions to internalize 
the external costs that their risk-taking decisions and their failure 
imposes on the rest of the economy? So rather than moving from 
“privatizing profits and nationalizing losses” to nationalizing both, I 
would advocate to privatizing both (which might also reduce both profits 
and losses!). An old idea that has not really been popular among policy 
makers these past years in the industrialized world. An idea that some 
observers might call naive. But maybe an idea whose time has finally 
come. 
A call for action 
In the following, I will discuss in more depth the main messages of this 
book. But let me point to three headline messages: 
The Eurozone crisis – lots of ideas, little action 
One of the important characteristics of the current crisis is that there 
are actually two crises ongoing in Europe – a sovereign debt and a bank 
1. We need a forceful and swift resolution of the Euro crisis, without 
further delay! For this to happen, the sovereign debt and banking 
crisis that are intertwined have to be addressed with separate 
policy tools. This concept finally seemed to have dawned on policy 
makers. Now it’s time to follow up on this insight and be resolute.  
2. It’s all about incentives! We need to think beyond mechanical 
solutions that create cushions and buffers (exact percentage of 
capital requirements or net funding ratios) to incentives of 
financial institutions. How can regulations (capital, liquidity, tax, 
activity restrictions) be shaped that forces financial institutions to 
internalize all repercussions of their risk, especially the external 
costs of their potential failure?  
3. It is the endgame, stupid. The interaction between banks and 
regulators/politicians is a multi-round game. As any game theorist 
will tell you, it is best to solve this from the end. A bail-out at 
failure will provide incentives for aggressive risk-taking throughout 
the life of a bank. Only a credible resolution regime that forces risk 
decision takers to bear the losses of these decisions is incentive 
compatible in aligning the interests of banks and the broader 
economy.  
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crisis – though the two are deeply entangled. Current plans to use the 
EFSF to recapitalise banks, however, might not be enough, as there are 
insufficient resources under the plans. Voluntary haircuts will not be 
sufficient either; they rather constitute a bank bailout through the back 
door. Many policy options have been suggested over the past year to 
address the European financial crisis but, as time has passed, some of 
these are no longer feasible given the worsening situation. It is now 
critical that decisions are taken rapidly, the incurred losses are 
recognised and distributed clearly, and banks are either recapitalised 
where possible or resolved where necessary. 
Comparisons have been made to the Argentine crisis of 2001 (Levy 
Yeyati, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler 2011), and lessons on the effect 
of sovereign default on the banking system can certainly be learned. 
The critical differences are obviously the much greater depth of the 
financial markets in Greece and across the Eurozone, and the much 
greater integration of Greece, which would turn a disorderly Greek 
default into a major global financial shock. Solving a triple crisis such as 
Greece’s – sovereign debt, banking, and competitiveness – is more 
complicated in the case of a member of a currency union and, even 
though Greece constitutes only 2% of Eurozone GDP, the repercussions 
of the Greek crisis for the rest of the Eurozone and the global economy 
are enormous (similar to the repercussions of problems in the relatively 
small subprime mortgage segment in the US for global finance in 2007-
8). 
One often-discussed policy option to address the sovereign debt crisis is 
creating euro bonds, i.e. joint liability of Eurozone governments for 
jointly issued bonds. In addition to their limited desirability, given the 
moral hazard risk they are raising, their political feasibility in the current 
environment is doubtful. Several economists have therefore suggested 
alternatives, which would imply repackaging existing debt securities into 
a debt mutual fund structure (Beck, Uhlig and Wagner 2011), or issuing 
ESBies funded by currently outstanding government debt up to 60% of 
GDP, a plan detailed by Markus Brunnermeier and co-authors in this 
book. By creating a large pool of safe assets – about half the size of US 
Treasuries – this proposal would help with both liquidity and solvency 
problems of the European banking system and, most critically, help to 
distinguish between the two. Obviously, this is only one step in many, 
but it could help to separate the sovereign debt crisis from the banking 
crisis and would allow the ECB to disentangle more clearly liquidity 
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support for the banks from propping up insolvent governments in the 
European periphery. 
Regulatory reform – good start, but only half-way t here 
After the onset of the global financial crisis, there was a lot of talk about 
not wasting the crisis, but rather using it to push through the necessary 
regulatory reforms. And there have been reforms, most prominently the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the US. Other countries are still discussing different 
options, such as the recommendations of the Vickers report in the UK. 
Basel III, with new capital and liquidity requirements, is set to replace 
Basel II, though with long transition periods. Economists have been 
following this reform process and many have concluded that, while 
important steps have been taken, many reforms are only going half-
way or do not take into account sufficiently the interaction of different 
regulatory levers. 
The crisis has shed significant doubts on the inflation paradigm – the 
dominant paradigm for monetary policy prior to the crisis – as it does 
not take into account financial stability challenges. Research 
summarised by Steven Ongena and José-Luis Peydró clearly shows the 
important effect that monetary policy, working through short-term 
interest rates, has on banks’ risk-taking and, ultimately, bank 
fragility. Additional policy levers, such as counter-cyclical capital 
requirements, are therefore needed. 
The 2008 crisis has often been called the grave of market discipline, as 
one large financial institution after another was bailed out and the 
repercussions of the one major exception – Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy – ensured that policymakers won’t use that instrument any 
time soon. But can we really rely on market discipline for systemic 
discipline? As Arnoud Boot points out, from a macro-prudential view 
(i.e. a system-wide view) market discipline is not effective. While it can 
work for idiosyncratic risk choices of an individual financial institution, 
herding effects driven by momentum in financial markets make market 
discipline ineffective for the overall system.  
Ring fencing – the separation of banks’ commercial and trading 
activities, known as the Volcker Rule but also recommended by the 
Vickers Commission – continues to be heavily discussed. While Boot 
thinks that “heavy-handed intervention in the structure of the banking 
industry … is an inevitable part of the restructuring of the industry”, 
Viral Acharya insists that it is not a panacea. Banks might still 
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undertake risky activities within the ring. Capital requirements might be 
more important, but more important still than the actual level of such 
requirements is the question of whether the current risk weights are 
correct. For example, risk weights for sovereign debt have certainly 
been too low, as we can see in the current crisis in Europe. Critically, we 
need to fundamentally rethink the usefulness of static risk weights, 
which do not change when the market’s risk assessment of an asset 
class permanently changes. In addition, capital requirements have to 
take into account the co-dependence of financial institutions, as pointed 
out by Acharya and Matthew Richardson. This would lead to systemic 
risk surcharges, though they might not necessarily be perfectly 
correlated with the size of financial institutions. And whatever is being 
decided for the banking sector should trigger comparable regulation for 
the shadow banking sector to avoid simply shifting risk outside the 
regulatory perimeter. 
Tweaking different levers of the regulatory framework independent of 
each other can, however, create more risk instead of mitigating it. 
Capital requirements and activity restrictions that do not take into 
account the governance and ownership structure of banks can easily 
have counterproductive effects, as Luc Laeven argues. Stricter capital 
regulations can actually result in greater risk-taking when the bank has 
a sufficiently powerful and diversified owner, but have the opposite 
effect in widely held banks. A one-size-fits-all approach is therefore not 
appropriate. 
Another area of reform has been liquidity requirements, recognised as 
the biggest gap in Basel II. Enrico Perotti, however, points out that the 
suggested reforms – liquidity coverage ratios (buffers of liquid assets as 
a fraction of less stable funding) and net funding ratios (quantitative 
limits to short-term funding) – are (a) too rigid, (b) procyclical, and (c) 
distortionary against efficient lenders. He rather recommends using 
those ratios as longterm targets while imposing 'prudential risk 
surcharges' on deviations from the targets. 
Taxation of banks – why settle for fourth-best?  
For many years, taxation of financial institutions was a topic for 
specialists, as much among tax or public finance economists as among 
financial economists. The current crisis and the need for large 
recapitalisation amounts for banks have changed this dramatically, and 
taxation for banks now forms part of a broader debate on regulatory 
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reform. Proposals to introduce a financial transaction tax, in one form or 
another, have emerged in the political arena over the past three years 
with a regularity that matches seasonal changes in Europe. As Harry 
Huizinga and I point out, such a tax would not significantly affect banks’ 
risk-taking behaviour. Rather, it might actually increase market 
volatility and its revenue potential might be overestimated. Banks are 
under-taxed, but there are better ways to address this gap, such as 
eliminating the VAT exemption on financial services or a common EU 
framework for bank levies. 
Looking beyond national borders 
Cross-border banking in Europe can only survive with a move of 
regulation and resolution of cross-border banks to the European level, 
as emphasised by Dirk Schoenmaker. If the common market in banking 
is to be saved, the geographic perimeter of banks has to be matched 
with a similar geographic perimeter in regulation, which ultimately 
requires new European-level institutions. Many of the reforms being 
discussed or already implemented, including macro-prudential tools and 
bank resolution, have to be at least coordinated if not implemented at 
the European level (Allen et al. 2011). Critically, the resolution of 
financial institutions has an important cross-border element to it. In 
2008, authorities had limited choices when it came to intervening and 
resolving failing banks and, in the case of cross-border banks, 
resolution had to be nationalised. Progress has been made in the reform 
of bank resolution, both in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act and in the 
preparation of living wills. More remains to be done, especially on the 
cross-border level.  
While most of the discussion is currently on banking system reform in 
the US and Europe, we should not ignore trends in the emerging world. 
As Neeltje van Horen points out in her contribution, among the global 
top 25 banks (as measured by market capitalisation), there are 8 
emerging-market banks, including 4 Chinese, 3 Brazilian, and 1 
Russian. Due to their sheer size, emerging-market banks will almost 
undoubtedly soon become important players in the world’s financial 
system. And given that US and European banks are still to adjust to the 
new rules of the game, large banks from the emerging countries are 
likely to step into the void left by advanced-country banks. There will be 
a continuing shift towards emerging markets also in banking! 
Why do we care? 
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Comments 
Above all, however, it is important to remind ourselves of why we care 
about the banking sector in the first place. Given the roles of credit 
default swaps, collateralised debt obligations, and other new financial 
instruments in the recent financial crisis, financial innovation has 
garnered a bad reputation. But in his contribution, Ross Levine reminds 
us of the powerful role of financial innovation through history in 
enabling economic growth and the introduction of new products and 
providers in the real economy. Financial innovation fosters financial 
deepening and broadening. Rather than stifling it, we have to harness it 
for the benefit of the real economy. 
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